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Abstract 
Defense acquisition is characterized by significant levels of risk throughout the 
lifecycle.  Risk, of course, may result in undesirable outcomes.  Deriving from many 
sources, both technical and organizational, risk is inherently a socio-technical 
phenomenon in enterprises such as acquisition.  As such, it is difficult to address.  At 
the same time, fiscal pressures are causing decreased funding and increased 
expectations for acquisition performance.  This points to the importance of risk 
characterization and mitigation.  Our previous work has focused on using simulation 
to model and analyze acquisition processes and incentives, to understand how they 
can be designed to improve outcomes.  Traditional simulation analysis is not well-
suited to modeling the socio-technical complexities of risk in a systematic way, 
though.  This paper presents a decision/event network construct implemented within 
enterprise simulation models to represent the complexities of risk over time.  The F-
35 Joint Strike Fighter program is analyzed with respect to risk and potential 
outcomes using this enterprise simulation framework.  The F-35 program embodies 
a number of transformative approaches to the defense acquisition enterprise.  Such 
enterprise transformation efforts are prone to substantial risk.  In particular, cost and 
schedule risks and outcomes are studied relative to program design decisions.  Risk 
mitigation strategies are identified and presented. 
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Addressing Risk in the Acquisition Lifecycle 
With Enterprise Simulation 
Introduction 
Defense acquisition is characterized by significant levels of risk throughout 
the lifecycle of new system development, production, and sustainment.  
Fundamentally, risk results from the combination of an uncertain future 
(probabilities) and its potential bad outcomes (magnitudes).  Classic risk drivers in 
acquisition include immature technologies, overly optimistic baseline cost and 
schedule estimates, overly stringent requirements, poorly understood implicit 
requirements, and changing missions and environments.  Increasingly, risks come 
from new sources, such as fiscal pressures on government spending and 
transformative initiatives in the acquisition enterprise. 
This paper presents an enterprise simulation approach to analyzing risk in 
major acquisition programs.  This approach models interactions between firms and 
agencies within the acquisition enterprise, and it also includes a decision/event 
network that is issued to characterize the relationships of risk drivers to outcomes.  
The approach is used to model the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a 
large-scale acquisition program that has seen effects from risk.  The F-35 program 
embodies a number of transformative approaches to the defense acquisition 
enterprise.  Such enterprise transformation efforts are prone to substantial risk.  The 
focus is on the decision/event network and its use in characterizing risks.  This 
program is currently in a combination of system design and development and low-
rate initial production. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section, 
Simulation of Acquisition Programs and Risk, describes the use of simulation in 
modeling and analyzing acquisition programs, with a focus on the uncertainties 
involved in such programs.  Enterprise Simulation and Acquisition Risk Analysis 
introduces the methodology of enterprise simulation to study risks in acquisition 
programs.  Then, the next two sections, F-35 Program Analysis and Risk Analysis 
and Mitigation, discuss the application of enterprise simulation to the F-35 program 
and analysis and mitigation of that program’s risks.  Finally, the last section, 
Conclusion, concludes and provides directions for future research. 
Simulation of Acquisition Programs and Risk 
Computer simulation has traditionally been used to assess performance of 
acquisition and related processes.  One such widespread use of simulation has 
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been in manufacturing, as a means of predicting such metrics as throughput and 
cost for a factory (Smith, 2003).  Simulation enables the analysis of behavior and 
performance over time, taking into account probabilistic effects and risk (Law, 2007).  
Simulation can provide analysis under different factory configurations and operating 
scenarios, thus enabling possible factory designs, modifications or operating policies 
to be studied prior to adoption.  Risk can be studied by identifying sources of risk 
and modeling their outcomes and probabilities for occurrence. 
In recent years, simulation has seen application in a number of acquisition-
related areas beyond production.  These include system design and development 
(Bodner & Wade, 2013), software system development (Madachy, 2008), supply 
chain design and analysis (Kleijnen, 2005), and fleet sustainment (Smith, Searles, 
Thompson, & Cranwell, 2006).  Other work has used simulation to study enterprise-
level phenomena in acquisition (Bodner, Rahman, & Rouse, 2010; Wirthlin, 2009).  
These efforts have studied a variety of risk sources, including mis-allocation of 
resources, unplanned rework, changing mission profiles, changing demand patterns, 
and poorly designed processes. 
The traditional use of simulation has been to study the technical aspects 
associated with acquisition program elements.  These include work processes, 
testing, quality, schedules, part flows, inventory levels, bottlenecks, costs, and lead 
times.  While this type of analysis is quite useful, it does not capture the socio-
technical aspects of the enterprise, with its multi-actor collaborations, decision-
making, public-private partnerships, and risks.  For instance, firms that develop and 
manufacture complex products and systems employ an enterprise paradigm that 
involves large number of collaborating stakeholder firms (Bodner & Lee, 2012).  This 
type of enterprise modeling has increasingly been incorporated in simulation (Barjis, 
2011; Glazner, 2011). 
Recently, two related types of simulation methods have come into usage that 
address socio-technical aspects of a system—agent-based simulation (Hillebrand & 
Stender, 1994; Saam & Schmidt, 2001) and organizational simulation (Nissen, 2007; 
Prietula, Carley, & Gasser, 1998; Rouse & Boff, 2005).  Agent-based simulation 
focuses on the interaction of different agents in an eco-system.  In an acquisition or 
enterprise context, agents can represent individuals or firms.  One relevant example 
of its use is in modeling actor interactions in a supply chain (Albino, Carbonara, & 
Giannoccaro, 2007).   
Organizational simulation seeks to model the behavior of people and firms in 
the context of a world model and organizational story.  A world model represents the 
elements internal to the organization being modeled, as well as those relevant 
external elements.  The organizational story represents a scenario being modeled.  
Organizational simulation has been used to model healthcare delivery, research & 
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development, and electronics design (Rouse & Bodner, 2009).  In particular, 
research & development is characterized by high levels of risk, as new technologies 
under development often do not work out.  This is similar to acquisition programs 
that involve development of new systems, as opposed to a new version of an 
existing system.  Thus, one important use of simulation is to determine which 
enterprise-level and program-level decisions and criteria are best-suited to improved 
enterprise outcomes in a risky environment. 
Enterprise Simulation and Acquisition Risk 
Analysis 
Recent work has extended the concept of organizational simulation to an 
enterprise simulation framework with an agent-based model for actors in an 
enterprise, a process-oriented model for phases and milestones in an enterprise, 
and a decision/event network to represent a risk-focused way of representing an 
organizational story (Bodner & Rouse, 2010).  Actors represent organizations (e.g., 
firms or agencies) that participate in the enterprise.  In an acquisition enterprise, they 
can perform a variety of actions, including 
 communicate with other actors, 
 react to incentives and information, 
 accrue costs, 
 change variables under their control, such as schedule targets or 
budgets, 
 progress through processes and tasks,  
 restructure a program, or 
 terminate a program. 
Figure 1 shows an example set of interactions in an acquisition context.  The 
government program office interacts with the lead contractor, as well as with other 
agencies.  The lead contractor manages the contractor network.  Note that some 
contractors may be sub-contracted to multiple contractors.  In a typical major 
program, of course, there are dozens of agencies, some outside the Department of 
Defense (DoD), and there are thousands of contractors organized in a multi-tier 
structure. 
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Figure 1. Example Interactions of Agents as Firms or Agencies 
To provide a risk-focused organizational story, this framework utilizes a 
concept from interactive drama and artificial intelligence, that of a drama manager 
(Roberts & Isbell, 2008).  Interactive drama is a narrative implemented in 
computational form, similar to a game, in which a user interacts with a story.  The 
drama manager interacts with the story flow to give the story particular 
characteristics (e.g., simplicity versus complexity).  It does this through a construct 
known as a plot point model, which abstracts important events in the plot of the 
story.  A plot point model is organized as a directed acyclic graph of plot point 
nodes, some of which may have precedence relationships between them (i.e., arcs), 
and some of which may be mutually exclusive.  A precedence relationship from node 
1 to node 2 (i.e., node 1 precedes node 2, or 1→2) implies that for node 2 to occur, 
node 1 must occur.  Given precedence relationships from multiple plot points to a 
particular plot point, only one of the predecessor plot points need occur to allow the 
successor plot point to occur (i.e., an “or” relationship among the precedence 
relationships).  A precedence relationship can be mandatory in that the predecessor 
must occur for the successor node to occur (i.e., enabling “and” relationships).  
The graph is acyclic to disallow two or more plot points from simultaneously 
having a cycle of precedence relationships among them.  A terminal plot point 
represents an end to the story.  The drama manager may influence the plot via 
actions so that certain events occur (or are more likely to occur), or it may likewise 
prevent certain events from occurring.  The particular path of plot points realized in 
an interactive drama reflects the instantiated plot. 
Adapted to a simulation context, the plot point model (or decision/event 
network) is used to represent important events in the simulation that relate, for 
example, to risk in the unfolding simulation.  Thus, the role of a drama manager (or 
simulation manager) in the simulation context is to guide the simulation via actions 
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outcome of the simulation can then be compared to the risk profile chosen.  Example 
simulation manager actions include the following: 
 Direct selection of a node from among alternatives,  
 Preference given to a particular node via probabilities, or 
 Exclusion of a particular node. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships among the simulation manager, the plot 
point model and the simulation.  Certain events in the simulation model correspond 
to decisions or events in the decision/event network.  However, the simulation 
contains many events and behaviors that are not critical to the organizational story 
and hence do not correspond to network nodes.  Nodes 2 and 3 are mutually 
exclusive (only one at most may happen).  Arcs 4→7 and 5→7 are mandatory 
precedence relationships, meaning that both nodes 4 and 5 must occur for 7 to 
occur.  We also introduce the notion of both a trigger node and an associated 
inactive relationship.  If a trigger node is activated, it in turn activates its associated 
relationship arc(s) (either a precedence arc or mutual exclusion arc).  For example, 
in Figure 2, if node 2 occurs, it may trigger node A, which then activates a 
precedence relationship 2→4. 
The decision/event network prescribes the relationships among decisions and 
events, not the outcome of a particular organizational story.  An outcome is realized 
by a particular sequence of decisions and events.  A valid sequence, or path, must 
conform to the precedence and exclusion constraints of the decision/event network, 
and it can have only one terminal node (at the path end).  Nodes 6 and 7 are the two 
terminal nodes.  A particular decision/event network can generate many different 
paths.  An example valid path from Figure 2 is 1→2→6, as is 1→3→4→5→7.  Note 
that Figure 2 does not specify valid paths, only precedence relationships.  Thus, 
nodes 4 and 5 can occur in a valid path.  In fact, both must occur for node 7 to 
occur. 
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Figure 2. Simulation and Decision/Event Network Interaction 
Given a particular decision/event network, the enterprise simulation 
framework conducts a pre-processing operation to determine the set of possible 
paths, and the result is returned in the form of a partial game tree.  A game tree is a 
construct from game theory that defines moves that two players may make as 
alternating nodes in the tree.  The simulation manager and simulation correspond to 
the two players in this context.  Nodes in the decision/event network represent 
actions taken by the simulation (i.e., decisions and events).  The simulation manager 
actions are not represented in a path, as these actions are intended to influence the 
path followed for a particular simulation outcome.  Including the simulation 
manager’s possible actions would make the full game tree representation unwieldy.  
Hence, the set of paths or simulation outcomes is a partial game tree.  The partial 
game tree for the decision/event network from Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3.  The 
trigger node A is not shown, since it does not represent an event or decision in the 
simulation other than to enable the 2→4 precedence relationship.  An algorithm for 
generating a partial game tree from a decision/event network is provided in Bodner 
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Figure 3. Partial Game Tree From Decision/Event Network in Figure 2 
The simulation manager’s actions are based on its search function and 
evaluation function.  These functions are used to evaluate paths for selection of a 
next node in the partial game tree and a corresponding simulation manager action.  
For risk, the evaluation can use the expected value of a function of the program’s 
schedule and cost outcomes for selection of the next node.  This must be 
determined over the set of path remainders associated with each candidate’s next 
node, where a path remainder is the set of nodes comprising the rest of a particular 
path given a current node location. 
For example, assume that the simulation has executed the partial path 
1→3→4 in Figure 3.  Nodes 5 and 6 are the two candidates to execute next.  The 
possible path remainders are 6, 5→6, and 5→7.  The path with only node 6 is 
evaluated using simply the estimated schedule and cost values for node 6.  Node 5 
is evaluated using a function of the estimated schedule and cost values of the two 
other path remainders.  The search function is responsible for searching through the 
partial game tree to identify paths and apply the evaluation function. 
Of course, the simulation is stochastic, and the evaluation can only use 
estimates of schedules and costs.  Another issue is the computational complexity 
associated with the evaluation over a large decision/event network.  Thus, the look-
ahead capability of a search function to analyze a path remainder can be limited to a 
certain number of nodes in the path.  In this case, an estimate function must be 
provided for the last node to be considered that accounts for the paths that emanate 
from it. 
The expectimax formulation (Michie, 1966) is one example of a search 
function with an evaluation function.  Expectimax is a variant of minimax, which is a 
formulation used in two-player games, where the goal of one player (i.e., the 
simulation manager) is to seek the maximum benefit, while hedging against 
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Expectimax is of interest here because it specifically includes uncertainty 
associated with future outcomes of the simulation (and hence future organizational 
stories).  Pure minimax assumes a rational opponent in game play. Expectimax, 
assuming use in a full game tree, is shown below in pseudo-code: 
function expectimax(node, depth) 
if node is a terminal node or depth = 0 
return the heuristic value of node 
else if simulation manager is to play at node 
// Return value of maximum-valued child node 
let α := -∞ 
foreach child of node 
α := max(α, expectimax(child, depth-1)) 
else if simulation event at node 
// Return weighted average of all child nodes’ values 
let α := 0 
foreach child of node 
α := α + (Probability[child] * expectimax(child, depth-1)) 
return α 
While the above function seeks to maximize, it can also be framed as a minimization 
function.  Note that the search function is invoked only when the simulation manager 
is to select or influence selection of a next node in the partial game tree.  However, it 
executes recursively using the full game tree that consists of simulation and 
simulation manager actions.  Typically, at the simulation’s turn in the recursion, it is 
assumed that all child nodes have equal probability of occurring, in the absence of 
other information.  To address computational complexity, the depth of each search 
(i.e., look-ahead capability) may be bounded (i.e., the depth parameter in the 
pseudo-code). 
The interaction of the simulation manager and the simulation is detailed 
below. 
1. First, in a pre-processing step, the simulation manager constructs a 
partial game tree from the decision/event network.  The decision/event 
network is modeler-specified.  The partial game tree is stored. 
2. The simulation manager evaluates each path in the partial game tree 
using the search and evaluation functions. 
3. Starting at the root node, the simulation manager performs an action 
using results from the search and evaluation functions.  This action 
may be to select one of the root node’s children, or it may give 
preference to one child node, or it may exclude one or more child 
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nodes.  If more than one node remains feasible after the simulation 
manager’s action, a probabilistic function is executed to select the next 
child node. 
4. The simulation then is initiated to execute the selected node and its 
associated events and behavior not represented directly in the 
decision/event network.  These events may also result in changes to 
node values for the evaluation function in the partial game tree in 
future iterations. 
5. The simulation manager iteratively takes turns with the simulation as 
follows. 
a. The simulation manager marks the node in the partial game tree as 
having occurred and sets its pointer to this node in the partial game 
tree.  
b. The simulation manager invokes the search and evaluation 
functions on the children nodes of the current node.  
c. Based on results of the search and evaluation functions, the 
simulation manager performs an action that results in selection of 
one of the child nodes (similar to step 3 above). 
d. Control returns to the simulation.  The simulation executes the 
selected node and its associated events and behavior (similar to 
step 4 above). 
e. If the selected node is a terminal node, control goes to step 6 
below.  Otherwise, it returns to step 5a above. 
6. The simulation ends, and final statistics are computed. 
The enterprise simulation modeling framework is implemented using 
AnyLogic™ with a set of Java class extensions for the agent models, the simulation 
manager, plot point models, and partial game trees.  AnyLogic is a commercially 
available simulation product that supports multi-paradigm modeling using discrete-
event, agent-based and system dynamics simulation. 
F-35 Program Application 
One major acquisition program that is of interest with respect to risk analysis, 
and application of the enterprise simulation framework, is the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) program.  This section discusses the F-35 program as an application 
of risk analysis using enterprise simulation. 
F-35 Program Background 
The F-35 program grew out of the need for a next generation tactical fighter 
fleet to replace the aging fleet of F-16s and F-18s.  Due to the large size of these 
legacy fleets, the Joint Strike Fighter effort started as an ambitious, large-scale 
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concept.  As the program became more defined, Boeing and Lockheed Martin 
Aeronautics led consortia that developed concept aircraft in a competition for the 
system design and development contract.  When the Lockheed consortium won, the 
Joint Strike Fighter program entered into system design and development (SDD) in 
2001.  The initial planned procurement quantity was 2,852 planes. 
The JSF actually consists of three variant aircraft (Gertler, 2012).  The first (F-
35A) is a conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft designed for the Air 
Force.  The second (F-35B) is a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft 
designed for the Marines.  The third (F-35C) is a carrier-suitable aircraft (CV) 
designed for the Navy. 
The JSF program has used a transformative approach to acquisition of a 
major weapons system.  In this context, transformation means a major change in the 
enterprise, moving from an as-is enterprise to a to-be enterprise, with specific intents 
(Kessler & Heath, 2006).  The transformative elements of this approach include the 
following. 
 Rather than the traditional command-and-control relationship between 
the lead contractor and its suppliers, the contract required a 
partnership model among three firms—Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, 
BAE Systems, and Northrop Grumman (Kessler, McGinnis, & Bennett, 
2012).   
 The program was planned as a global effort, whereby design, 
development, and production activities would occur globally across an 
international consortium of firms, rather than primarily at one single 
site.  Countries with firms represented in the consortium would be 
partners, agreeing to purchase F-35s (Kapstein, 2004). 
 Modeling and simulation technologies have been used extensively in 
SDD, essentially to provide a “testing in software” capability.  The 
confidence in this testing approach enabled substantial concurrency to 
be designed into the program between development and production so 
that production started prior to the completion of flight testing (DoD, 
2011).  The level of concurrency was higher than similar programs. 
 The program is developing three variants using a common platform 
targeting a high level of commonality of components across the three 
variants.  The intent is to reduce cost (promote affordability) while 
providing aircraft to support three mission types.  The three mission 
types require different high-level technical capabilities (stealth, STOVL, 
supersonic, and carrier capabilities) that historically have not been 
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combined to this degree in a single craft or platform (Blickstein et al., 
2012). 
 The production supply network was planned for use by sustainment 
(Kessler et al., 2012). 
One of the first efforts in the SDD phase was to set up the global technology 
infrastructure needed to support the design of the F-35 among the different firms 
involved.  This was a substantive and transformative initiative that required 
significant alignment among the enterprise leadership and major changes to 
processes among all stakeholder firms (Bodner et al., 2011).  The technology 
requirements were challenging—providing real-time global access to the design 
database subject to myriad management and security constraints.  The technical 
challenges turned out to be less difficult than the social and process changes 
needed.  Overall, the set-up of the technology infrastructure was deemed 
successful. 
Nevertheless, such major transformative elements entail risk (Rouse, 2006), 
and there have been a number of less-than-desirable outcomes (and potential future 
outcomes) for the program. 
 A reduction in planned purchases of 400 occurred early in SDD, driving 
up unit costs (Blickstein et al., 2012). 
 In the earlier part of SDD, there were weight and design issues that 
required significant additional effort to address (Blickstein et al., 2012). 
 The weapons bay of the CV variant was redesigned for larger payload, 
resulting in the same redesign for the STOVL and CTOL variants.  This 
redesign caused weight and stability problems for the STOVL 
(Blickstein et al., 2012). 
 Due to schedule slippages and cost growth, the program was 
rebaselined in 2004 and 2007 (Blickstein et al., 2012). 
 After DoD’s Joint Estimating Team issued a report in late 2009 stating 
that the program would need an additional 30 months to complete 
SDD, the program was restructured (Government Accountability Office 
[GAO], 2011), adding 13 months to SDD schedule (as well as the 
needed funding), and withholding $614 million in award fees from the 
lead contractor.  Three aircraft were also added to early production. 
 In 2010, the program was found to have increased in cost over both 
the original baseline and the then-current baseline by enough that it 
was certified with a Nunn-McCurdy breach (Blickstein et al., 2012).   
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 Continued technical issues with the STOVL variant resulted in that part 
of the program being placed on a two-year “probation,” with its 
production schedule moved back (GAO, 2011). 
 The U.S. government’s fiscal situation has called into question whether 
the planned quantities of aircraft will be purchased.  Already the UK 
government has reduced its planned purchases (Gertler, 2012). 
Blickstein et al. (2012) conducted a root cause analysis of the Nunn-McCurdy 
breach and identified the following underlying risk factors as root causes: 
 SDD was designed around a concept demonstrator rather than around 
a prototype that would have accounted better for producibility.  Harvey 
and Ryan (2012) found evidence that a prototype can reduce cost 
growth in procurement for fixed-wing aircraft. 
 The engineering strategy focused on developing the CTOL variant first, 
rather than tackling the more difficult engineering design and 
development of the STOVL. 
 The original baseline was overly optimistic on cost and schedule due to 
assumptions on component commonality and technology integration. 
These in turn drove other issues that resulted in the eventual breach.  Getting the 
high-level technical capabilities across the variants was more technically challenging 
than anticipated, involving extensive trade-offs.  The initial weight problems caused 
redesign, and these design changes had to be distributed throughout the enterprise 
of collaborators.  Due to the large number of suppliers, this process delayed test and 
production and hence drove up costs.  Delays also resulted in work being done with 
higher labor rates. 
The issue of concurrency has been raised as a cause of the program’s cost 
and schedule issues (DoD, 2011).  Historical analysis has indicated that concurrency 
has not been a major cost and schedule risk driver (Congressional Budget Office 
[CBO], 1988).  However, this type of analysis likely does not account for the 
complexity of the JSF program. 
At present, the program is entering a fifth low-rate initial production (LRIP) 
increment that is a fixed-price contract with risk sharing between the government 
and contractor (Gertler, 2012).   
Decision/Event Network 
The decision/event model for the model of the JSF SDD is shown below in 
Figure 4, and detailed descriptions for each node are provided in Table 1.  At the top 
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of the figure are the major program design decisions modeled in this example.  
These include 
 whether a prototype article is developed prior to full-scale development 
(i.e., beyond the concept demonstrator that was developed prior to 
SDD),  
 whether the CTOL variant or the STOVL variant is given first design 
priority, 
 whether the program engages in high concurrency or no concurrency, 
and 
 whether the program engages in an alignment effort at the 
commencement of SDD. 
These are risk drivers to be explored as the JSF program unfolds. 
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Figure 4. JSF SDD Decision/Event Network 
If a prototype is developed, it is assumed that a weight reduction program 
later in development is not needed.  Thus, nodes 2 and 11 are mutually exclusive.  If 
a CTOL-first design and development strategy is adopted, then trigger node A 
causes the CDR for the CTOL variant to occur before that of the STOVL, as well as 
the flight test for the CTOL variant to occur before that of the STOVL.  Similarly, if a 
STOVL-first design and development strategy is adopted, the converse occurs.  
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of the CTOL or STOVL variant first design strategies must occur, as well as one of 
the concurrency alternatives. 
After program design, the program must attain global design capability to 
enable collaborating firms to co-design the F-35.  There may or may not be an effort 
by the leaderships of the top-tier partner firms to achieve alignment prior to this.  
After global design capability is achieved, preliminary design review (PDR) can 
occur, and then critical design review (CDR) and flight testing.  Note that CDR and 
flight testing are separate for each variant.  Also, it is assumed for this analysis that 
the CV variant undergoes both CDR and flight testing after the other two variants 
have done so.  Thus, if the no-concurrency program design decision is made, 
inactive arc C is activated, causing LRIP not to occur before all flight testing is done. 
The two terminal nodes represent either full-rate production at the planned 
level of production, or a 50% reduction that results from excessive cost growth, in an 
effort to reduce the overall program cost. 
Table 1. Decision-Event Descriptions 
Decision-Event Node Description 
1. Contract Awarded SDD contract awarded to Lockheed Martin consortium.  This 
initiates the organizational story. 
2. Prototype Development This represents the program enterprise decision to develop or 
not develop a prototype aircraft in addition to the concept 
aircraft that won the SDD contract.  Note that an affirmative 
decision delays PDR. 
3. CTOL-First Strategy The program decides to design the CTOL variant first. 
4. STOVL-First Strategy The program decides to design the STOVL variant first.  Note 
that this is mutually exclusive with the CTOL-first strategy. 
5. High Concurrency A high level of concurrency is designed into the program. 
6. No Concurrency No concurrency is designed into the program.  Note that this is 
mutually exclusive with the high concurrency decision. 
7. Program Design 
Complete 
Program design is complete. 
8. Collaborative Alignment The enterprise conducts an effort to achieve collaborative 
alignment on the changes needed to enable the global SDD 
technology infrastructure to be stood up.  Achievement 
includes executive alignment among partner organizations, as 
well as technical management alignment.  Achievement 
speeds up technology development over the case where there 
is little alignment.  
9. Global Design 
Capability 
The enterprise achieves capability to support JSF design via 
global technology infrastructure. 
10. PDR The program passes preliminary design review.  
11. Weight Reduction The program engages in a major weight reduction effort. 
12. CTOL CDR The CTOL variant passes critical design review.  Note that 
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CDR is a separate event for each variant. 
13. STOVL CDR The STOVL variant passes critical design review. 
14. CV CDR The CV variant passes critical design review. 
15. CTOL Flight Test Start The CTOL variant starts flight testing.  Once again, flight tests 
are modeled separately for each variant. 
16. STOVL Flight Test 
Start 
The STOVL variant starts flight testing. 
17. CV Flight Test Start The CV variant starts flight testing. 
18. LRIP Low rate initial production begins. 
19. Production Ramp-up Production ramp-up begins.  This is a terminal decision/event. 
20. Major Planned U.S. 
Purchase Reduction 
The U.S. decides to reduce its purchase quantity by 50%. 
A relatively simple agent interaction model is used to model the actors in the 
program.  The program office, the lead contractor, and partner contractors are 
agents that interact in terms of cost accruals, program decisions, and program 
alignment. 
Baseline Model—Variables, Parameters, and Model Logic 
The primary variables relate to schedule and cost.  Supporting data is derived 
from the 2012 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the F-35 (DoD, 2012).  Cost 
variables are consistent with the 2012 SAR in that cost is divided into the categories 
of  
 research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E),  
 procurement, and  
 military construction.   
The SAR further subdivides costs between the Navy (STOVL and CV variants) and 
the Air Force (CTOL variant) and also considers the aircraft costs separately from 
the engine costs, since the engine was categorized as a separate program.  In the 
model, Navy and Air Force costs and the aircraft and engine costs are combined 
under the three main categories of RDT&E, procurement, and military construction.  
It should be noted that the RDT&E costs include non-Treasury funds (i.e., costs paid 
by partner countries in the F-35 program).  In addition, base year 2012 dollars are 
used to track costs, providing a consistent unit of measure for the span of the 
program.  It should be noted that the use of base year dollars has been criticized as 
a unit of measure because it understates actual out-year costs due to the effect of 
inflation.  The main variables are as follows: 
Ti = occurrence time for node i in the decision/event network (in months) 
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Rt = cost accrual of RDT&E expenditures as of month t (in base year 2012 
dollars) 
Pt = cost accrual of procurement expenditures as of month t (in base year 2012 
dollars) 
Ut = estimated final unit cost as of month t (in base year 2012 dollars per aircraft 
unit) 
Unit cost is computed as Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC).  PAUC 
considers RDT&E costs, procurement costs, and military construction costs in the 
overall program cost, which is then divided by the number of units to be made for 
both RDT&E (i.e., test articles) and procurement.  This unit cost measure is used in 
preference to Average Procurement Unit Cost or fly-away cost, since PAUC 
considers RDT&E and military construction expenditures.  This is especially relevant 
to a program such as the F-35 that is non-derivative of prior programs and thus has 
a substantial RDT&E cost component.  PAUC not only includes those costs currently 
accrued, but also costs projected through the end of full rate production in 2037.  
Thus, in the simulation model, Ut is computed via a look-ahead replication of the 
simulation starting at t and ending at production completion.  This replication factors 
in the probability of full production (decision/event node 19) versus reduced 
purchase (decision/event node 20). 
Cost accruals for RDT&E and procurement are assumed to occur at a rate 
dependent on the current phase of the program.  These rates are parameters in the 
simulation model and are computed using cost data from the 2012 SAR (in base-
year 2012 dollars).  Tables 2 and 3 show the monthly spend rates for both RDT&E 
and procurement and the time periods from which they are derived using the SAR 
data.  These are computed by converting the annual SAR data to monthly rates.  In 
cases where the period spans only a partial year, the annual rate is pro-rated and 
then converted to monthly.  For instance, an 18-month period spanning a full year 
and half of another would add the first year’s cost plus half the second year’s cost, 
then divide by the 18 months to obtain a monthly rate.  In the simulation model, the 
rates are random variables uniformly distributed around the parameters in Tables 2 
and 3 via the distributional form U(0.95c, 1.05c), where c is the cost rate in question. 
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Table 2. Spend Rates for RDT&E 
Program Phase Rate Period of Derivation 
Initial accrual prior to SDD $4,495M total 1994–9/2001 
Up to PDR $245.5M per month 10/2001–4/2003 
PDR to CDR $448.9M per month 5/2003–6/2007 
Flight test—segment 1 $380.6M per month 7/2007–12/2008 
Flight test—segment 2 $332.8M per month 1/2009–6/2010 
Flight test—segment 3 $141.7M per month 7/2010–12/2018 
Table 3. Spend Rates for Procurement 
Program Phase Rate Period of Derivation 
Initial accrual prior to SDD $0 total 1994–9/2001 
LRIP preparation $47.9M per month 3/2006–3/2007 
LRIP $597.7M per month 4/2007–9/2018 
Full production (assuming 
all planned aircraft are 
produced) 
$178,801.4M total 10/2018–9/2037 
Two additional parameters are the total amount of military construction 
expenditures M ($3,897.8 million) and the total number of aircraft that are planned 
for production (2,457, 14 of which are test planes produced via RDT&E). 
The decision as to whether the program performs full rate production at the 
planned level or whether it reduces the buy by 50% is made probabilistically 






 	 	 	50% 1 	 	  (2) 
Recall that  is the projected unit cost (PAUC) at the end of LRIP, 
assuming that full rate production is to occur.  Thus, if  is less than a threshold A, 
then full rate production occurs.  If it is over a threshold B, then the full buy does not 
occur.  Otherwise, there is a probability that decreases linearly with  whereby full 
rate production occurs.  For the baseline model, A is set to $80 million, while B is set 
to $200 million.  This corresponds to program costs of $196.6 billion and $491.4 
billion, respectively, for the full purchase. 
Of course, if the purchase amount is reduced by 50%, this dramatically 
affects the unit cost, since the fixed RDT&E and military construction costs must be 
amortized over a smaller number of units.  Also, the procurement cost is not strictly 
linear, since efficiencies of increasing returns to scale are typically built into 
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projected production costs.  Thus, one cannot simply reduce the procurement cost 
by half and obtain the procurement cost for 50% fewer planes.   
In theory, these returns to scale are modeled by such approaches as a Cobb-
Douglas production function (Cobb & Douglas, 1928), which uses an exponential 
function to relate inputs to outputs such as production quantity.  Depending on the 
sign of the exponents, different returns to scale behaviors can be represented, 
including increasing, decreasing, or constant.  However, the SAR data are not 
amenable to a statistical fit of such an exponential function using cost as input and 
production quantity as output.  Thus, a piece-wise linear function was constructed by 
linear regression.  Experimentation was performed to determine best cut-off points 
between a relatively small number of different linear segments, based on the best 
statistical fit.  The results are shown in Table 4, where Q is the production quantity, 
and P is the procurement cost.  Note that the production quantity funded by 
procurement is 2,443, whereas RDT&E is used to fund 14 additional aircraft.  Also, 
these equations do not apply for small quantities of aircraft. 
Table 4. Regression Results for Production Function of F-35 Procurement 
Quantity (Q) Years Production Equation R2 
0–179 2007–14 Q = -4.76 + 0.00455P 0.999 
180–559 2015–19 Q = -182 + 0.00836P 0.994 
560–1,960 2020–21 Q = -427 + 0.0110P 1.000 
1,961–2,443 2032–37 Q = -712 + 0.0123P 1.000 
If a purchase reduction is made, it reduces the total purchased from 2,443 to 
1,221.  This quantity falls into the third row of Table 4, with an input procurement 
cost of P = $149,818.2M.  The 14 aircraft purchased from RDT&E are included, 
then, in the total program quantity of 1,235 considered for the PAUC computation.  
The following two parameters are defined: 
u19 = production quantity for full production (node 19) = 2,457 
u20 = production quantity for reduced purchase (node 20) = 1,235 
The initial month is set to the kick-off of the SDD, which is October of 2001.  
Thus, t = 1 refers to this month, and T1 = 1 (i.e., contract award is defined to occur in 
the first month of the simulation). 
Validation 
The baseline model is validated against current outcomes from the F-35 
program by using the path in the decision/event network that corresponds to the 
existing program, as shown in Figure 6.  Note that this assumes full production, as 
does the current program. 
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Figure 5. Current JSF Program 
Comparisons from 25 simulation replications against outcomes from the 
existing JSF program are shown in Table 5.  Existing program figures come from the 
2012 SAR.  It should be noted that these existing figures include projections from 
present until the expected initiation of full rate production in September 2018. 
Table 5. Validation 
Outcome Actual/Projected 
Program Outcome 
95% Confidence Interval 
From Simulation Outcomes 
Expected schedule at initiation 
of FRP (months) 
204 (Sept 2018) (202.5, 206.0) 
RDT&E cost incurred at 
initiation of FRP (base year 
2012 $) 
$59,398.1M ($58,317.7M, $59,450.4M) 
Procurement cost at initiation 
of FRP (base year 2012 $) 
$77,328.7M ($81,602.3M, $83,647.4M) 
Unit cost (PAUC, base year 
2012 $ per unit) 
$130.0M ($131.0, 132.7M) 
The values from the baseline simulation are reasonably in line with the 
program outcome values.  The schedule and the RDT&E costs incurred lie within 
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biased upward slightly via parameters to account for a greater chance that the actual 
program outcomes will be higher rather than lower than the ones projected from the 
2012 SAR.  One primary reason is that the procurement cost is based on SAR data 
that includes a five-year projection of outcomes through 2018.  The simulated 
outcome of unit cost is biased upward since it not only includes the projection of 
procurement costs through 2018, but also procurement costs through 2037 (the 
anticipated end of full rate production).  RDT&E, on the other hand, is mostly 
expended by this point in the program, and final expenditures are more certain. 
Alternate Scenarios 
The baseline simulation model is enhanced with additional scenarios for 
analysis, which include a possible prototype, a STOVL-first design strategy, a no-
concurrency option, and the lack of an effort at alignment in preparation of global 
design.  Altogether, 32 different paths are considered in the partial game tree, shown 
in Table 6.  Path 17 refers to the baseline case.  Path 18 assumes outcomes of the 
current program, with reduced purchase in the future. 
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Path (using nodes as defined in Table 1) 
1 Y C H Y F 1→2→3→5→7→8→9→10→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→19 
2 Y C H Y R 1→2→3→5→7→8→9→10→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→20 
3 Y C H N F 1→2→3→5→7→9→10→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→19 
4 Y C H N R 1→2→3→5→7→9→10→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→20 
5 Y C N Y F 1→2→3→6→7→8→9→10→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→19 
6 Y C N Y R 1→2→3→6→7→8→9→10→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→20 
7 Y C N N F 1→2→3→6→7→9→10→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→19 
8 Y C N N R 1→2→3→6→7→9→10→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→20 
9 Y S H Y F 1→2→4→5→7→8→9→10→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→19 
10 Y S H Y R 1→2→4→5→7→8→9→10→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→20 
11 Y S H N F 1→2→4→5→7→9→10→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→19 
12 Y S H N R 1→2→4→5→7→9→10→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→20 
13 Y S N Y F 1→2→4→6→7→8→9→10→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→19 
14 Y S N Y R 1→2→4→6→7→8→9→10→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→20 
15 Y S N N F 1→2→4→6→7→9→10→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→19 
16 Y S N N R 1→2→4→6→7→9→10→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→20 
17 N C H Y F 1→3→5→7→8→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→19 
18 N C H Y R 1→3→5→7→8→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→20 
19 N C H N F 1→3→5→7→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→19 
20 N C H N R 1→3→5→7→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→18→16→17→20 
21 N C N Y F 1→3→6→7→8→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→19 
22 N C N Y R 1→3→6→7→8→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→20 
23 N C N N F 1→3→6→7→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→19 
24 N C N N R 1→3→6→7→9→10→11→12→13→14→15→16→17→18→20 
25 N S H Y F 1→4→5→7→8→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→19 
26 N S H Y R 1→4→5→7→8→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→20 
27 N S H N F 1→4→5→7→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→19 
28 N S H N R 1→4→5→7→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→18→15→17→20 
29 N S N Y F 1→4→6→7→8→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→19 
30 N S N Y R 1→4→6→7→8→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→20 
31 N S N N F 1→4→6→7→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→19 
32 N S N N R 1→4→6→7→9→10→11→13→12→14→16→15→17→18→20 
1 “Y” means prototype developed; “N” means no prototype.  
2 “C” means CTOL-first design; “S” means STOVL-first.  
3 “H” means high concurrency; “N” means no concurrency.  
4 “Y” means alignment sought; “N” means no alignment sought.  
5 “F” means full production of planned quantity; “R” means reduction of 50%. 
Risk Analysis and Mitigation 
This section describes use of the simulation model to perform risk analysis.  
The simulation produces performance measures of unit cost (PAUC), schedule, 
RDT&E cost, and procurement cost.  Unit cost is the primary performance measure 
chosen for analysis and is the decision criterion, since it is one of the prime 
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measures used to judge program success and program cost breaches.  The other 
measures will be examined, as well. 
Risk Perspectives 
Two different scenarios are studied, consisting of differing parameters.  Within 
each case, three perspectives are examined.  The first perspective is that of a risk-
neutral decision-maker.  A risk-neutral decision-maker is defined as one that would 
prefer to minimize the expected unit cost for the F-35 acquisition.  The second 
perspective is that of a risk-averse decision-maker.  A risk-averse decision-maker 
would like to minimize the maximum expected unit cost.  The final perspective is that 
of a risk-seeking decision-maker.  A risk-seeking decision-maker seeks to minimize 
the minimum expected unit cost. 
The expectimax framework is used for the search and evaluation functions for 
each of these three perspectives.  The objective is to minimize some function of unit 
cost.  The search and evaluation functions operate as follows. 
Let node i be a node in the partial game tree, and let Ci be the set of child 
nodes of i.  Let i* be the number of the node in the decision/event network that 
corresponds to node i.  Note that the partial game tree may contain multiple copies 
of each node in the decision/event network.  The node index in the decision event 
network is used to reference simulation output variables to the corresponding node 
in the partial game tree. 
Let E(i) be the evaluation function for i.  Let Si be the set of terminal nodes for 
the set of paths that emanate from i.  For j ∈ Si, E(j) is defined as a function of the 
final projected unit cost at the time of node j. 
 
∗
,  (3) 
Note that the projected unit cost estimate is made at the time in the simulation 
of node i.  Also, the function is dependent on the particular node j.  In the F-35 
example, for instance, the unit cost of the terminal node depends on whether there is 
full production or reduced purchase. 
For j such that for all k ∈ Cj, k ∈ Si, E(j) is defined as the expected value of the 
unit cost over the child nodes weighted by the probabilities in Equations 1 and 2.  
For Equation 3, p19 is given by Equation 1, and p20 is given by Equation 2, where 
nodes 19 and 20 are the two terminal nodes. 
 ∑ ∗∈    (4) 
For j such that for all k ∈ Cj, k ∉ Si, E(j) is defined as the expected value of the 
unit cost averaged over the child nodes.  Note that E(i) can be computed with 
Equations 3 or 4. 
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 ∑ ∈    (5) 
The search function is exhaustive, meaning that it examines each path 
emanating from i to its end.  It does this by executing a simulation for each path 
starting at node i and terminating at the path’s terminal node and using Equations 3 
to 5 to provide an evaluation function for the children of node i.  Note that the 
function form for 
∗
,  depends on the risk perspective being utilized.  For each 





) as the starting point, and the projected function of final unit cost is 
computed by the simulation. 
For the risk-neutral perspective, the functional form sums military 
construction, current cost accruals, and an average value for future cost accruals, 
namely ∗  and ∗ , which are computed with a simulation replication 
using distributional averages of cost and schedule variables in the simulation.  It 
then divides by the units produced at terminal node j. 
 
∗
, ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
∗
 (6) 
Similarly, the risk-averse perspective substitutes ∗  and ∗  for 
the value of future cost accruals.  These terms are computed using a simulation 
replication from using distributional maximums for cost and schedule variables.  
Finally, the risk-seeking perspective substitutes ∗  and ∗  for the value 
of future cost accruals.  These terms are computed with a simulation replication 
using distributional minimums for cost and schedule variables. 
For each perspective within each case, 100 replications of the simulation are 
made.  The output results are then analyzed using Minitab 16. 
Scenario 1 
For the different risk perspectives in the first scenario, the following 
assumptions are made and parameters adopted using the baseline model as a 
starting point. 
 For the case of no alignment sought, the attainment of global design 
capability is pushed back by three months. 
 For the case of no concurrency, LRIP commences after flight testing 
begins for the CV variant by a period of months triangularly distributed 
~TR(16, 21, 18).  In this notation, the first parameter is the minimum, 
the second the maximum and the third the mode.  The triangular 
distribution is used often in simulation when there is little information 
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on an exact distributional form.  LRIP lasts for a period of months 
distributed ~TR(60, 75, 68) months.  However, LRIP is given a 75% 
increase in procurement cost rate due to the focused effort in a 
shortened timeframe separate from design. 
 For the STOVL-first design case, the STOVL CDR occurs after the 
CTOL CDR design would have occurred by a period of months 
distributed ~TR(6, 9, 27), allowing additional time for the more complex 
requirements for the STOVL.  However, the flight testing begins twelve 
months sooner. 
 For the prototype development case, PDR is pushed back an amount 
of time distributed ~TR(20,36,24), and the PDR cost rate is increased 
by 50% to reflect the prototype development cost.  Both CDR and full 
rate production are pushed forward by a period of months distributed 
~TR(9,18,15), reflecting efficiencies gained by knowledge from the 
prototype.  Finally, the procurement cost rate is decreased by 10% to 
allow for knowledge gained by the prototype, as an estimate reflecting 
results from Harvey and Ryan (2012) indicating that procurement costs 
can be reduced by a prototype. 
 For the case of prototype development and no concurrency, full-rate 
production is pushed forward by a period of months distributed ~TR(3, 
10, 8) instead of ~TR(9,18,15), reflecting increased schedule needed 
for no concurrency. 
Summary performance statistics from the 100 simulation replications for the 
three perspectives are shown below in Table 7.  The column with heading “Full 
Production” denotes the percentage of simulation outputs that result in full 
production versus reduced purchase. 
Table 7. Average Simulation Results for Each Perspective in Scenario 1 
Case Unit Cost Schedule RDT&E Cost Proc. Cost Full Production 
Risk-neutral $132.4M 188.9 mos. $65,070.5M $199,239.4M 69%
Risk-averse $130.4M 186.8 mos. $63,690.7M $201,812.6M 73%
Risk-seeking $130.8M 189.7 mos. $65,258.7M $202,934.9M 74%
The unit costs are not statistically different across the three perspectives.  
There is moderate evidence that the schedule in the risk-seeking perspective differs 
from that in the risk-averse perspective (with p = 0.065).  For RDT&E costs, 
however, the cost from the risk-averse perspective turned out to be statistically 
different from that of the others.  For it and the risk-averse perspective, p = 0.026, 
while for it and the risk-seeking perspective, p = 0.012.  The procurement costs are 
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not statistically different among the three perspectives.  There is not a statistically 
significant difference among the percentages of replications at which full production 
is achieved among the three perspectives.  In conclusion, for the set of parameters 
in this particular scenario, there is little observable difference in outcomes among the 
three different risk perspectives.  This suggests that the three perspectives, for the 
set of parameters operating in this scenario, select path outcomes that generate 
relatively similar performance outcomes. 
More interesting, though, is the distribution of paths through the program 
lifecycle produced by each of the three alternative perspectives.  These are 
summarized in Table 8.  Note that a path pair is shown here for each entry in the 
path distribution.  The path pair consists of the two paths with the same set of 
program design decisions, but different outcomes relative to purchase reduction 
versus full production.  For instance, paths 13 and 14 have the same set of design 
decisions (prototype development, STOVL-first design strategy, no concurrency, and 
program partner alignment sought immediately after contract win).  However, path 
13 has full production, while 14 has reduced purchase.  We assume that the risk 
perspective selection of paths relates to the program design decisions, and not to 
the production level outcome, which is dependent on the customer (i.e., government) 
via probabilities.  The percentage of full production outcomes for each set of 
program decisions made under each risk perspective is shown in column 4. 
Table 8. Paths Generated by Different Perspectives for Scenario 1 
Perspective Path Pair Frequency Full Production 
% 
Risk-neutral 13/14 65% 64.6% 
15/16 33% 75.8% 
9/10 2% 0% 
Risk-averse 13/14 54% 74.1% 
5/6 30% 76.7% 
15/16 14% 64.3% 
7/8 2% 0% 
Risk-seeking 13/14 69% 76.8% 
15/16 28% 67.9% 
9/10 3% 66.7% 
All perspectives prefer development of a prototype.  The majority of selections 
include the STOVL-first design strategy (except for the 32% of the risk-averse 
perspective’s selections that consist of paths 7/8 and 5/6).  The vast majority of 
selections include no concurrency.  The exceptions are paths 9/10 chosen by the 
risk-neutral and risk-seeking perspectives.  The majority of paths selected include 
the alignment effort at the beginning of SDD.  However, a significant fraction do not 
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(7/8 and 15/16), indicating that this effort tends to have less effect on cost reduction 
than the other design decisions and is often overcome by the randomness in 
outcomes from the simulation’s probabilistic nature. 
The path selection outcome distribution generated from the risk-averse 
perspective seems quite different from that of the other two perspectives.  This is 
confirmed using a chi-squared test of independence of categorical variables. The 
risk-averse perspective is different from both other perspectives, with p = 0.000 in 
each case.  However, the evidence did not support the conclusion that the risk-
neutral and risk-seeking perspectives had statistically different outcomes. 
The risk-averse perspective selected the CTOL-first design strategy for a 
significant fraction of its paths, indicating that the STOVL-first design strategy likely 
has a probabilistic risk of higher cost that contributes to a greater maximum 
expected unit cost.  The prototype option and the no-concurrency option seem not to 
have this issue (i.e., they are net positives to unit cost in terms of the expected 
value, minimum expected value, and maximum expected value). 
Scenario 2 
In Scenario 1, the prototype alternative is quite attractive, since it pushes 
back PDR (increasing schedule with a relatively low burn rate), while pushing up 
CDR and production (decreasing schedule with a relatively high burn rate).  In 
Scenario 2, the prototype development alternative is made less attractive in terms of 
schedule for the program. 
In the case of the prototype relative to the baseline without it, CDR and 
production are pushed forward a period of months triangularly distributed ~TR(-9, 
12, 3).  This means that there is a risk that the prototype may actually delay CDR 
and production.  Similarly, for the case of the prototype and no concurrency, 
production is pushed forward months distributed ~TR(-15, 4, -4) rather than  ~TR(-9, 
12, 3).  Thus, production is expected to be pushed back relative to the baseline here. 
Table 9. Average Simulation Results for Each Perspective in Scenario 2 
Perspective Unit Cost Schedule RDT&E 
Cost 
Proc. Cost Full 
Production 
Risk-neutral $139.2M 195.6 mos. $63,827.7M $211,117.5M 68%
Risk-averse $133.8M 187.5 mos. $60,096.7M $218,806.7M 76%
Risk-seeking $144.1M 214.6 mos. $72,278.9M $201,483.9M 62%
In this scenario, there are significant differences among the outcome 
measures from the three different perspectives.  The unit costs of the risk-averse 
and risk-seeking perspectives show significant difference with p = 0.001.  There is 
moderate evidence that the unit cost of the risk-neutral perspective differs from the 
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other two, with p values of 0.081 (from risk-averse) and 0.130 (risk-seeking) 
respectively.  The schedule outcomes and RDT&E cost outcomes differed among all 
three perspectives with p = 0.000 for each pair-wise comparison.  Finally, the 
procurement costs showed significant difference between the risk-averse 
perspective and the risk-seeking perspectives (p = 0.005).  There was moderate 
evidence of differences between other pairs of procurement costs, with p = 0.185 for 
risk-neutral and risk-averse and p = 0.130 for risk-neutral and risk-seeking. 
One key difference between this scenario and the previous is the difference in 
the percentage of outcomes that achieve full production among the perspectives.  
Clearly, the risk-seeking perspective achieves a lower percentage of full production 
outcomes than the other two.  The difference between it and the risk-averse 
perspective’s full production outcome is significant at p = 0.03.  However, there is not 
sufficient evidence to indicate a true difference between the risk-neutral outcome 
and the other two.  It is the lower full production outcome for the risk-seeking 
perspective that is causing a decrease in its procurement cost, due to fewer units 
being produced on average, as well as an increased unit cost, due to having to 
amortize RDT&E and procurement costs over fewer units.  This is especially the 
case since RDT&E costs for the risk-seeking perspective is substantially larger than 
for the other two perspectives. 
Once again, the different perspectives yield differing distributions of paths 
selected.  These are shown below in Table 10. 
Table 10. Paths Generated by Different Perspectives for Scenario 2 
Perspective Path Pair Frequency Full Production 
% 
Risk-neutral 21/22 31% 64.5% 
29/30 31% 67.7% 
31/32 20% 90.0% 
23/24 17% 47.1% 
25/26 1% 100.0% 
Risk-averse 21/22 60% 81.7% 
23/24 40% 67.5% 
Risk-seeking 13/14 58% 60.3% 
15/16 30% 63.3% 
9/10 12% 80.0% 
Clearly, the risk-seeking perspective yields a much different distribution of 
outcomes paths than do the other two perspectives.  Also, the risk-neutral 
perspective seems to yield different path results than the risk-averse perspective.  
From a statistical point of view, however, the chi-squared test of independence is 
valid only for the comparison of the risk-averse and risk-seeking perspectives, where 
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it provides strong evidence of a difference in outcomes with p = 0.000.  It is not valid 
for the other two comparisons due to numerical issues.  It will be assumed, though, 
that the other two comparisons, in fact, yield different results, and that all three 
perspectives have differing path outcome distributions.  
In this scenario, only the risk-seeking alternative chooses to execute a 
prototype development, and this is done in 100% of cases.  It also chooses the 
STOVL-first design strategy in 100% of cases.  In fact, its path outcome distribution 
appears similar to the distribution of the risk-seeking perspective in Scenario 1 
(Table 8).  However, the chi-squared test of independence of categorical variables is 
used to show that, despite the same set of outcome paths, the proportions of path 
outcomes are different enough to declare that the distributions are different at p = 
0.04.  Thus, in Scenario 2, the conclusion is that high-concurrency is somewhat 
more favored by the risk-seeking perspective than in Scenario 1, due to the higher 
proportion of path pair 9/10. 
The risk-averse perspective chooses no prototype, CTOL-first design 
strategy, and no concurrency.  Similar to Scenario 1, the alignment effort alternative 
is preferred (with 60% of outcomes), but its effectiveness at cost reduction seems to 
be marginalized by the effect of randomness in the simulation. 
The risk-neutral perspective augments the risk-averse perspective’s 
selections with a variety of path pairs, all of which include the STOVL-first design 
strategy and one of which contains high concurrency (25/26), although at only one 
occurrence.   
Overall, several conclusions can be drawn from Scenario 2 for the set of 
parameters studied: 
 Use of a prototype is a risk-upside strategy associated with risk-
seeking, as is STOVL-first design strategy.   
 Similar to Scenario 1, the alignment effort produces too little cost 
savings in RDT&E to offset much of the simulation randomness. 
 Risk-seeking with this set of parameters resulted in higher rates of 
purchase reduction, which drives lower procurement costs, but also 
higher unit costs.  So risk-seeking is not an attractive strategy in this 
scenario. 
Discussion 
The two scenarios analyzed here present different risks in the program design 
decisions of interest for the F-35 program.  These risks are studied from the 
perspectives of a risk-neutral decision-maker, a risk-averse decision-maker and a 
risk-seeking decision-maker.  In Scenario 1, most of the risk of changing program 
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design decisions from those made in the actual program is to the upside.  That is, 
they tend to improve the unit cost outcome over the span of probabilistic outcomes.  
The three perspectives, therefore, have very similar performance outcomes.  In 
addition, their path selection outcomes are not drastically different.  Thus, it can be 
concluded for the most part that changing design decisions to prototype 
development, STOVL-first design, and no concurrency yields superior results. 
On the other hand, Scenario 2 presents a more balanced set of risks if design 
decisions are changed.  The different risk perspectives differ substantially in their 
performance outcomes and path selections.  This demonstrates the capability of the 
enterprise simulation methodology to analyze a program or enterprise based on 
different risk perspectives, so that the decision-maker can select the one that best 
matches his or her perspective, while understanding outcomes based on other 
perspectives. 
It should be noted that the alignment effort tends to have a positive effect on 
unit costs in both scenarios.  However, it is often masked by the probabilistic nature 
of simulation outcomes, since its effect is not large.  However, a failure or significant 
delay in attaining global design capability could have political or organizational costs 
that are not modeled here.  This is an avenue of further research. 
Finally, the parameters used in both scenarios reflect estimates of what the 
actual effects would be from changing design decisions.  A rigorous use of sensitivity 
analysis should be conducted in the future to generate a set of response surfaces to 
characterize the conditions under which certain design decisions are superior to 
others under different risk perspectives.  
Conclusions and Future Research 
This report has presented an enterprise simulation framework and 
methodology for studying risks in defense acquisition programs.  The main focus is 
the use of a decision/event network as an organizational story to characterize risk 
drivers and outcomes, as well as to support simulation analysis of the risks and risk-
related outcomes.  This is a novel use of simulation, which tends to focus mostly on 
experimental analysis or what-if analysis for such systems as acquisition.   
In particular, the enterprise simulation methodology allows studying risks from 
different risk perspectives.  This methodology is applied to a case study involving 
acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  The F-35 program is the largest military 
acquisition program in history, and it has generated risks and adverse outcomes, in 
part due to its scale, complexity, and transformative approach to acquisition.  
Simulation analysis is used to study the preferred outcomes of three different risk 
perspectives on two different scenarios.  It is shown that the risk perspectives can be 
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used to identify when a particular scenario has a mostly upside set of risks, in which 
case the perspectives tend to agree on preferred organizational stories and 
performance outcomes, and also when a scenario has a mixture of upside and 
downside risks.  Similarly, it can be inferred that a scenario with mostly downside 
risks can be identified in this manner.  Such analysis is especially important in 
transformation efforts, where many risks are present and may interact.   
Two additional benefits of this methodology are the following: 
 For a complex scenario with many different possible decisions and 
events, this methodology can be used to identify promising paths 
through the decision/event network, thus avoiding analysis over the 
whole state space. 
 A decision-maker can view the scenario through his or her preferred 
risk perspective to determine which outcomes are preferred. 
There are a number of future research avenues that can be pursued, both for 
the enterprise simulation methodology and its application to the F-35 program.  In 
terms of the methodology, future research includes the following: 
 The number of nodes and complexity of the network should be scaled 
up to allow analysis of computational issues.  Computational methods 
can then be developed to ameliorate the effect of large state spaces. 
 The current methodology uses only one performance measure in the 
evaluation function.  This could easily be extended to a weighted 
function of two or more performance measures.  It would also be of 
interest to use other multi-criteria decision approaches such as Pareto 
optimality or minimization of deviance from multiple performance goals. 
 The methodology could be made interactive, with a person as the 
decision-maker relying on their interpretation of evaluation functions. 
In terms of the F-35 program analysis, future research includes the following: 
 Additional socio factors could be included beyond alignment, such as 
the political and organizational cost of certain decisions. 
 The procurement cost data from the SAR is assumed to be accurate 
for the program’s out-years.  Analysis could be done to determine the 
effect of increases or decreases in these projected figures. 
 Different probabilities for program purchase reduction could be 
analyzed to determine their effect on the different risk perspectives. 
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 Likewise, a more complex set of adverse outcomes that just a 50% 
purchase reduction could be studied (e.g., a range of percentages for 
the reduction or even a cancellation alternative). 
 The analysis could be extended to sustainment, which is expected to 
consume major funding once the fleet starts to come online. 
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